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ABSTRACT 
Today, net related net services are indivisible in our life. Therefore, for the success of 
certain types of organizations, some sustained simplification of services is essential. 
However, these service area units were usually hindered by the constant threat from 
numerous kinds of attacks. One such attack is called a distributed denial of service 
attack and leads to a problem starting with a temporary delay of the server in order to 
terminate the service's non-availability. A honeypot may be a kind of lure, but in 
order to prevent potential attackers from diverting, observing, preventing, and 
ensuring the ongoing convenience of the service. This study gives insight into the 
problem with distributed denial-of-service attacks. This researcher provides insight 
into problems caused by distributed denial of service attacks, simulates several types 
of attacks, analyzes the results, performs each single simulation, and shows how to 
prevent distributed denial of service attacks. This project explains recently 
introduced distributed denial of service (DDoS) and its techniques. DDoS attack 
method using NS - 2 simulator software. This research provides the results of four 
experiments related to DDoS attacks in a simulation environment with NS 2. The 
result of this project shows that the three main factors of DDoS attack are attack time, 
attack strength and pocket size. Attack time is mainly related to attack strength. 
Finally, it is shown that the buffer size plays a role in processing attack traffic. 
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ABSTRAK 
Hari ini, perkhidmatan web berkaitan rangkaian tidak dapat dipisahkan dalam 
kehidupan kita. Oleh itu, untuk kejayaan sesetengah jenis organisasi, beberapa 
penyederhanaan perkhidmatan yang berterusan adalah kritikal. Bagaimanapun, unit-
unit kawasan perkhidmatan ini sering terhalang oleh ancaman berterusan daripada 
pelbagai serangan. Satu serangan sedemikian dikenali sebagai penyangkalan 
penyebaran serangan diedarkan dan menyebabkan masalah dengan kelewatan 
sementara pelayan untuk menamatkan ketiadaan perkhidmatan. Honeypots boleh 
menjadi godaan, tetapi untuk menghalang penyerang berpotensi untuk beralih, 
memerhatikan, menghalang dan memastikan kemudahan perkhidmatan yang 
berterusan. Kajian ini mengkaji secara mendalam isu penyangkalan serangan 
serangan yang diedarkan. Para penyelidik menyelidiki masalah-masalah yang 
disebabkan oleh serangan penolakan yang disebarkan, menyusun beberapa jenis 
serangan, menganalisis hasilnya, melakukan setiap simulasi individu, dan 
menunjukkan bagaimana untuk mencegah penyebaran penyebaran serangan yang 
diedarkan. Projek ini menerangkan teknologi Penafian Pemberian Terdahulu (DDoS) 
yang baru dan teknologinya. Kaedah serangan DDoS menggunakan perisian 
simulator NS-2. Kajian ini menyediakan empat keputusan percubaan yang berkaitan 
dengan serangan DDoS dalam persekitaran simulasi NS 2. Hasil projek menunjukkan 
bahawa tiga faktor utama serangan DDoS adalah serangan, kekuatan serangan dan 
ukuran saku. Waktu serangan terutamanya berkaitan dengan kekuatan serangan. 
Akhirnya, saiz penampan paparan memainkan peranan dalam menangani lalu lintas 
serangan. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background   
The improvement in speed, reliability and accuracy of the current Internet 
framework's rapid technology has had a major impact on our daily lives. With the 
increase of Web-enabled applications, the number of important and secret 
information in public and private networks is increasing. Allow network design to 
effectively share resources among users of these networks, and Web-enabled 
applications play an important role in our daily personal and professional lives. [1, 
21]. 
Over the past few years, the Internet has provided a common communications 
and computing platform by connecting billions of computers. In addition, the 
connection between the Internet and wireless and mobile technologies is leading to 
an impressive revolution in modern devices and applications. [38]. Fig. 1.1: shows 
the internet users and how they increase yearly from 2005 till 2017. 
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Figure 1.1: No. of Internet users till 2017 [35]. 
People begin to exchange and share their important information with other 
network users through the Internet. However, due to this high degree of dependence 
on the Internet, some people use the weaknesses of the Internet to locate a part of it 
[10]. A common example of these weaknesses in the Internet is the speed difference 
between core routers and edge routers. Inadequate router configuration is another 
major weakness of the Internet. This weakness often makes network systems the 
targets of attacks that attempt to gain unauthorized access to important information 
or damage private or professional resources. Although many passwords and firewall 
systems have been developed in the past few years, these systems have no drawbacks 
or limitations [15]. Network systems can be protected using defense mechanisms that 
can identify intrusions when an intrusion occurs or is about to occur. This may be 
another form of defense. Despite great efforts made by defenders, zero-day and other 
complex attacks occur almost daily. Denial of service (DoS) attacks are classified as 
the most common and disruptive of all threats that network maintainers need to be 
aware of.[32]. As shown in Figure 1.2, in the third quarter of 2017, the number of 
SYN DDoS attacks continued to increase, from 53.26% to 60.43%. At the same time, 
the percentage of TCP DDoS attacks plunged from 18.18% to 11.19%, which did not 
affect the rating of this attack in the second position. Both UDP and ICMP attacks 
have become very rare: their share has dropped from 11.91% to 10.15% and 9.38%, 
respectively, to 7.08%. At the same time, the popularity of HTTP attacks rose from 
7.27% to 11.6%, ranking third [3]. 
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of DDoS attacks by type, Q3 2017[3]  
 
DDoS is a coordinated attack that uses a large number of infected hosts to start. In 
the initial stages, attackers can identify vulnerabilities in one or more networks to 
install malware programs on multiple machines to control them from a remote 
location. Next, the next step, usually the target machine outside the infected host's 
original network will be exploited by the attacker. These hosts will send attack 
packets to them by destroying these hosts without knowing the infected hosts. [2,33]. 
Depending on the strength of the attack packet and the number of hosts used for the 
attack, there will be corresponding damage in the victim network. If the attacker can 
use a large number of infected hosts, the network or Web server may be interrupted 
for a short period of time. Some common examples of DDoS attacks are fraggle, 
smurf, and SYN flooding. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
In the past decade years, this unresolved issue has been actively resolved in the IT 
community, and there was no definitive solution. The magnitude of the impact of 
DDoS encouraged me to do more research on this topic and to make my own 
contribution. As a result of such attacks, businesses closed down, the economy 
declined, and the government changed. Figure 1.3 shows that the number of attacks 
per day during the third quarter of 2017 ranges from 296 (July 24) to 1508 
(September 26). 
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Figure 1.3: the number of DDoS attacks in Q3 2017 [3] 
 
The highest number was registered on July 27 (1399) and September 24 
(1497). There was a relative decline in July 28 (300), May 31 (240) and September 
25 (297) [3]. 
Future warfare could cause the country to be defeated, so it will be a rocket 
with IP data packets. This is the result of expert prediction. In this survey, we 
classify and investigate the impact of DDoS attacks and their systems or services. 
Next, based on the DDoS attack detection function, the source detection and validity 
of the DDoS attack is checked. At the same time, this study uses technology to detect 
program anomalies and simulate DDoS attacks. This method improves the function 
of anomaly detection technology by combining detection of rule base and threshold 
value. Next, the selected DDoS attack analyzes the impact of the proposed 
technology as an invasion. Detect system performance. 
1.3 Objectives 
Based on the problem statements, there are three objectives that are going to be 
achieved. The objectives of this project are; 
1. To investigate DDoS attack characteristics and it’s detect technique 
effectiveness. 
2. To improve and propose alternative technique for detecting DDoS attack. 
3. To simulate the DDoS attack type and examine it using anomaly detection 
technique. 
4. To evaluate the performance of proposed techniques in detecting DDoS 
attack. 
1.4 Project Scopes 
The Scopes of this project are:  
1.  Investigate DDoS attacks and their types; study the impact of DDoS attacks 
and their impact on the system. 
PTTA
PERPU
STAKA
AN TU
NKU T
UN AM
INAH
5 
 
 
2. Check DDoS detection technology, study its ability to detect DDoS attacks 
and DDoS detection 
3.  Simulate the three most common and powerful DDoS attack types and 
examine them using anomaly detection techniques. 
4. Assess and validate our results together with other previous studies. 
1.5 Project Structure  
This is a project organization and it consists of five chapters. 
• Chapter 1 discusses the research background. In addition, the problem statement, 
project objectives, research scope, and project structure outline were introduced. 
• Chapter 2 presents a literature review that discusses the types of DDoS attacks, the 
impact of DDoS attacks on services or systems, DDoS detection techniques and their 
working principles, and reviews most of the DDoS detection capabilities. 
• Chapter 3 of this chapter describes the methodology scenario and the systems and 
software required to simulate this project, and will review the flow chart for this 
project. 
• Chapter 4 of this chapter will review the simulation steps and set up the test 
platform we studied. 
• Chapter 5 of this chapter will review our simulation results and our simulation 
results with other relevant studies and summarize the simulations and 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction  
One of the serious and challenging issues is distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attacks. Since a large number of insecure machines provide fertile ground for 
attacking zombies, attackers do not need to make any effort and can easily download 
and deploy automated scripts for exploitation and attack. On the other hand, due to 
the large number of attack machines, it is very difficult to prevent attackers or 
attackers from responding and tracking; using source address spoofing and the 
similarity between legitimate and attack traffic. Although research and business 
communities have designed many defense systems to deal with DDoS attacks, this 
problem has largely remained unresolved [30]. The comprehensive knowledge of 
DDoS attacks and their scenarios, objectives and detection methods are intended to 
be simplified in this chapter. Cosize related works were proposed and eventually 
developed in DDoS research. 
2.2 DOS Attack Scenario  
Victims receive a malicious stream of packets that can exhaust some critical 
resources. This happens in denial-of-service (DoS) attacks; this leads to denial of 
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service to legitimate customers of the victims (Tuomo Penttinen, 2005).
 
Figure 2.1: DoS attack scenario [25] 
In a typical denial of service attack scenario, attacker A sends a malicious 
packet flow to victim V and refuses to provide services to legitimate clients C1 and 
C2, as shown in Figure 2.1. Machine A is actually an agent machine, an unwitting 
participant destroyed by the attacker, because the attacker rarely uses his own 
machine to perform the attack. By misusing a vulnerability in the software that runs 
on the victim, the attack may exhaust key resources (vulnerability attacks)[34] or 
simply send more traffic than the victim (flood attack)[38] . 
Contain data packets of a particular type or content to exploit exploits that are 
normally included in exploits. [29].The number of exploits is small because the 
vulnerabilities can often be exploited by a small number of data packets. Both of 
these features (special types of packets and low capacity) can simplify the handling 
of vulnerability attacks - the target can patch its vulnerabilities or discover special 
types of packets and process them separately. 
A large number of floods overwhelmed the victim’s resources. Because 
malicious packets can be of any type or content, and high capacity hinders detailed 
traffic analysis, this strategy is more difficult to counteract. A common approach to 
defend against flood attacks is to provide victims with a wealth of resources because 
DoS attacks involve only one attack aircraft. To perform a successful attack, an 
attacker needs to find and subvert better-configured machines. With the amount of 
resources allocated to victims, the attackers find it more difficult to find enough 
agent machines [24]. 
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2.3 DDOS Attack Scenario  
A simple denial of service attack is performed from a number of subverted machines 
(agents), so-called Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks [27]. All machines 
are used at the same time and begin to generate as many data packets as they can 
send packets to victims, which is exactly what happens in Scarecrow and the most 
common scenarios. Due to the moderate functionality of the proxy machine, a large 
number of participating agents allow the attacker to overload the highly configured 
victims' resources. 
 
Figure 2.2: DDoS attack scenario [25] 
In a simple distributed denial of service attack scenario, attackers A and B send the 
malicious packet stream to victim V, denying its service to legitimate clients C1 and 
C2 shown in Figure 2.2 [8]. 
The vast majority of packets are sent from multiple attack sites to the victim 
site, which is what the DDoS attack contains. These data packets reach such a high 
volume that some of the key resources on the target (bandwidth, buffer, CPU time 
for calculation response) are quickly exhausted [14]. Victims either crash or spend a 
lot of time managing the traffic that cannot participate in their actual work [23]. 
Distributed denial of service attacks are widely considered to be the main threat to 
the Internet. Therefore, as long as the attack continues [16], legitimate customers are 
deprived of the victim's services. They have adversely affected the main Internet 
commerce sites, single machines and even services of core Internet infrastructure 
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services. Because very large-scale DDoS attacks occur irregularly (usually as a 
byproduct of viruses), Internet-wide communications are spreading for hours or 
worms). These incidents still caused major disruptions to users, costing the victims 
website millions of dollars, and the service resumed immediately after the attack 
subsided. In addition, the Internet is used daily for important communications such 
as stock trading, financial management, and even some infrastructure services [15]. 
Due to the DDoS attacks, many transactions must be processed in time and may 
be severely delayed. The impact of this attack is greater than the threat. Any 
immature user may locate and download DDoS tools and allow them to perform 
successful large-scale attacks. The attacker has almost no risk of being discovered. 
● There are two types of DDoS attacks that prevent the design of more effective 
defenses: DDoS traffic is very similar to legitimate traffic. Attacks usually occur 
in large quantities and consist of legitimate data packets. It cannot be 
distinguished on a data packet by packet basis because they completely integrate 
a small amount of legitimate client traffic. All victim-targeted packets can be 
grouped into higher-level semantic structures (for example, "all data streams 
exchanged between two IP addresses", "all HTTP data streams", and "supplied 
source IP address" by the defense system. "Etc.," then detects high-capacity or 
anomalous communications, performing many statistics on the dynamics of these 
structures. Afterwards, packets belonging to the suspicious structure will be 
supervised, and packets belonging to structures with legal behavior will be 
forwarded [26]. 
● Distribution of DDoS traffic. Attack flows only converge near the victims and are 
generated from many attacking machines throughout the Internet. In order to 
reduce the denial of service to the victims, the defense system must control most 
of the attacks. This indicates that the distributed system that the defense node 
covers an important part of the Internet or the system must be a single point 
system located near the victim. [19].  
● The goals of this paper are: Studying DDoS attacks and current detection 
techniques, simulating the most powerful attacks of DDoS attacks on anomaly 
detection techniques, and studying the effects of DDoS attacks and other research 
validation results and their Impact on the system, investigate DDoS detection 
technology, study its availability for detecting DDoS attacks and DDoS detection 
capabilities. 
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Several characteristics of DDoS attacks present challenges to the design of 
successful defenses [20]: 
• IP source spoofing use. During an attack, source address spoofing is often 
used by attackers - they forge information in the IP source address field in the attack 
packet header. Tracking the proxy machine is very difficult and it considers the 
attacker to gain an advantage from IP spoofing. Therefore, it brought a few terrible 
consequences. The information stored on it (i.e., the access log) does not help you 
find the attacker yourself because the tracking risk of the agent machine is low. As a 
result, the DDoS incident was very encouraging. Moreover, attackers can reuse the 
proxy machine's address by hiding them for future attacks. Finally, attack packets 
appear to come from many different sources because they carry a wide variety of 
addresses; fair sharing technology is a direct solution to resource overload problems 
and can be defeated. The ability to perform reflector attacks [Pax01] is another 
advantage that IP spoofing offers to attackers. The attacker (in the name of the victim) 
asks the public service to generate a large number of replies to specific small 
requests (magnification effects). The source addresses of the victims are forged and 
sent to the public server: so that the attacker can generate as many service requests as 
possible based on his resource license [23]. These servers can direct the number of 
replies to the victim (thus reflecting and increasing attack power) and overloading 
their resources. [CERe] describes the common case of reflector attacks. Using the 
victim's spoofed source IP address, the attacker sends a large number of UDP-based 
DNS requests to the name server. The name server response may be much larger than 
the DNS request, so there is the possibility of bandwidth amplification. This is why 
any name server response is sent back to the fraudulent IP address as a destination. 
Even if Retrospective Problem 1 is resolved, reflector attacks will not help. Public 
servers are uninformed participants and their legitimate services are abused in attacks. 
They do not have any information about the attacker [25]. In addition, because this 
can cause harm to many other customers, their services cannot be disabled (i.e., stop 
the attack). They can prevent reflector attacks by limiting the amount of replies they 
are willing to generate for a particular IP address based on the resources and requests 
of these servers. It may consume a lot of memory resources because this method 
requires the server to cache the request address. 
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Figure 2.3: DDoS attack architecture [13] 
• A large number of proxy machines. Even if it is possible to successfully perform 
backtracking in the case of IP spoofing, it is difficult to say what actions can be taken 
for hundreds or thousands of proxy machines. Such a large number prohibits any 
rough automatic reply, designed to prevent attack traffic near the source. 
• Attacks on legitimate traffic similarities. To perform a successful denial of service 
attack, you can use any type of traffic to accomplish this. Compared with other 
traffic types, some traffic types have higher attack success rates than others, and 
attacks on different content and types of data packets target different resources. On 
the other hand, if the goal is merely to stifle the actions of the victim, then it can be 
achieved by sending a sufficiently large amount of traffic and blocking the victim's 
network. Blurring malicious traffic in legitimate traffic, attackers tend to generate 
legitimate data packets to perform attacks. Because malicious packets cannot stand 
out from legitimate packets, it is not possible to filter legitimate traffic from attack 
traffic based solely on inspection of individual packets. In order to extract 
transactional semantics from the packet flow, the defense system must retain a 
certain amount of statistical data to distinguish certain legitimate traffic (e.g. 
belonging to lengthy, well performing transactions) from attack traffic. 
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2.4 DDOS Attack Targets 
A single Web server connects to the entire university, the entire city and even the 
entire country's Internet connection, all of which may be the target of DDoS attacks. 
In general, DDoS attackers will choose any of the four generic targets in the victim's 
network, [6] as described below. 
2.4.1  On Infrastructure 
By targeting its infrastructure, many DDoS attackers are targeting network systems. 
Globally or globally, the DNS can range from the smallest wireless access point to a 
large public key infrastructure. The impact of a DDoS attack depends on the 
coverage of the infrastructure. 
2.4.2  On Link 
This link is a common target for DDoS attacks. By sending a large number of 
coordinated channels to completely expel the link, an attacker can successfully 
initiate a DDoS attack. As a result, many legitimate data packets may be dropped. 
2.4.3  On Router 
DDoS attacks usually target IP routers. By filling the routing table with a large 
number of routes, the CPU power is insufficient or the router memory is exhausted. 
This is a common method of launching a DDoS attack on a router. In order to launch 
such attacks, many attackers also exploited the weaknesses of routing protocols. 
2.4.4  On OS 
To protect resources from application DDoS attacks, the operating system (OS) can 
play an important role. Many attackers therefore target the operating system itself. It 
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may cause serious damage to all applications running on the operating system if such 
an attack can be successfully initiated [4]. 
2.4.5  On Defense Mechanism 
The defense system may be the target of the DDoS attack itself. DDoS attackers 
usually target firewalls and DDoS detection mechanisms. The goal of the firewall is 
to exhaust resources by sending a large amount of traffic. This traffic may be stateful 
or stateless. This may cause the firewall to maintain an excessive state and may 
eventually lead to insufficient memory. However, in the case of a defense 
mechanism, the impact or consequences of a DDoS attack will be different. 
Producing a large number of false alarms may be the result of a failure to implement 
the mechanism correctly. 
2.5 Source End Detection  
Because the anti-DDoS mechanism may make it impossible for them to get rid of the 
source defense, the overall requirements and features of the DDoS attack detection 
and defense system close to the source end cannot compete with the victim end 
defense itself [5]. The advantages of DDoS are: 
• Congestion avoidance: Internet resources can be preserved by restricting the flow 
of attacks in the vicinity of the source. These attack flows will be exhausted by the 
attack traffic. 
• Small collateral damage: The smallest legitimate user may be negatively impacted 
by rate restrictions or traffic filtering near the source. 
• Simpler backtracking: By approaching the source of information, it is possible to 
simplify attackers backtracking and simplify post-attack investigations. 
• Complex detection strategies: Put more router resources into DDoS defenses, 
making routers closer to relay routers that are likely sources of relay traffic closer to 
[28]. 
The disadvantage of DDoS is [12]: 
• Defense effectiveness: Attack packets are very similar to benign packets. The 
number of input/output connections, traffic or input/output packet rates are the 
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traditional methods based on detection. However, because only a small portion of the 
attack traffic can be observed at the source, these methods may not be available. 
• The source response must be selective. 
The issue of deployment incentives has also been improved. Although deploying 
tools that can detect outgoing DDoS attacks will cost the owner of the source 
network, the protection is still provided to the victim. Therefore, one of the ideal 
attributes of source defense is low deployment cost and low false alarm rate [17] 
2.6 Intrusion Detection Technique 
2.6.1  Anomaly Based Detection 
By observing deviations from the normal behavior of network traffic, attacks can be 
detected, as assumed by the anomalous DoS detection technique. The first one is 
extracted from the normal traffic observed in the past or is known as a synthetic 
traffic without attacks, which is an overview of normal behavior. The observed 
network traffic will be checked against the established profile of the traffic behavior, 
which will happen in later detection modes. How to generating an alert when traffic 
deviates from a profile that exceeds the threshold. In monitored network traffic, the 
occurrence of a worm is detected by analyzing the byte distribution of the payload of 
the packet and looking for deviations from the established profile. Since no a priori 
knowledge of a particular attack is required, unpredictable attacks can be detected, 
which is an advantage of anomaly detection. However, because the entire range of 
network traffic behavior during the learning phase may not be covered, the observed 
anomalies do not necessarily indicate an attack, and the false alarm rate may be high. 
2.6.2  Signature Based Detection 
DoS detection decisions are formed on the basis of accumulated knowledge of 
known attacks or system vulnerabilities, that is, they occur during signature detection. 
Security experts describe patterns of known attacks that generate signature libraries. 
Identify DoS attacks. These signatures are then matched against the observed traffic 
and an alert is raised whenever a match is found. Security experts can use signature 
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